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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

J

Plaintiff-Respondent, !i

It

JAMES V. CRESTANI,

Cas# No. 870525-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDEAT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of four counts of
Theft, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
76-6-404 (1978), in the Third Judicial District Court.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann.
78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether defendant was denied effective assistance

of counsel.
2.

Whether trial counsel's use of a civil statute was

sound trial strategy and therfore not ineffectiveness.
3.

Whether Jury Instruction No's. 16 and 25 were

prejudicial and misleading?
4.

Whether the trial court properly instructed the

jury regarding the culpable mental state of the offense of theft?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const. Amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public

trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
U.S. Cost. Amend. XIV:
Section 1. [Citizenship - Due process of
law - Equal protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of
laws.
Utah Const. Art. I, S VII:
Section 7.

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law.
Utah Const. Art. I, S XII:
Section 12.

[Rights of accused person.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have
a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf,
to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to
have a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the county or district in which the
offense to alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before

final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offence.
STATEMENT OF THE CftSE
Defendant, James V. Crestani, was charged with five
counts of Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1953, as amended).

Defendant was convicted

of four counts of theft in a jury trial held July 7-10, 1987, in
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable John A. Rokiqh, Judge, presiding.
Defendant was sentenced by Judge Rokich on October 23, 1987, to
four concurrent sentences of not less than one nor more than 15
years in the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1980, Defendant became the sole stockholder of Alta
Title Company (T. 503).

Sometime thereafter, defendant opened

several bank accounts for Alta Title at the Sandy State Bank (T.
503, 505). Although the exact number of corporate accounts is
unclear, there were, apparently, three corporate accounts and one
personal account of defendant's at the Sandy State Bank (T. 275).

The record in this case has four volumes of trial transcripts,
the court record file, and four supplemental transcripts. The
trial transcripts are numbered from 1 to 615, the record's file
from 1 to 505, and each of the four supplemental transcripts
begin on page "1". In order to avoid confusion, the State will
refer to the original trial transcript as (T. ), the court record
file as (R. ), and each supplemental transcript by the record and
page number(R* , p. ) #

At least one of the corporate accounts was a "Money
Market Demand" account which was referred to as "MMD-2" (T. 56,
70).
145).

The initial deposit into MMD-2 was on February 9, 1982 (T.
MMD-2 was not a personal account, but a commercial account

(T. 68-69).

MMD-2, however, was used by the defendant for

several purposes (T. 428). It was used as an escrow account, (T.
130, 143, 510), as a deposit account for contract service fees
which defendant claimed were his personal fees (T. 146-47, 267,
536), and for personal deposits of defendant (T. 410, 415).
MMD-2 was an active account which in February, 1982 had
a closing balance of $132,448.63 (T. 429). The following table
lists the deposits and withdrawals for the relevant months of
March through August of 1982:
MONTH

DEPOSITS

WITHDRAWALS

March
April
May
June
July
August

$1,066,883.23
1,623,808.64
759,193.15
2,635,507.50
2,154,433.83
1,208,787.09

$1,138,335.95
1,438,912.00
783,662.79
2,818,662.54
1,907,506.73
1,492,514.89

(T. 430-31).

Despite these large deposits, the withdrawals

eventually became greater.

MMD-2 was consistently overdrawn and

eventually caused American Title Insurance Company, who
underwrote Alta Title, to pay between $250,000 to $300,000 in
claims against Alta Title Company (T. 57-58, 144-242).

More than

half of these claims were attributed to the MMD-2 account.

Id.

During the months of May, June, and August of 1982,
defendant's personal bank account was also continually overdrawn
(T. 79, 84, 97). Funds were occasionally transferred from MMD-2
to defendant's personal account or were simply withdrawn from
-4-

MMD-2 (T. 77-78, 81, 94). The first such instance occurred on
May 7, 1982, when defendant telephoned Cleo Rasmussen, the then
vice-president of Sandy State Bank, and asked her to prepare a
withdrawal of $4,000 in cash from the MMD-2 account (T. 24-25)
(State's Exhibit 3; Appendix A).

Defendant sent two runners to

the bank who picked up the cash and delivered it to defendant (T.
14, 130-33).

Defendant testified that he used some of these

funds for employee bonuses, including himself (T. 530).
Again, on May 19, 1982, defendant telephoned Ms.
Rasmussen and requested that $20,000 be transferred from MMD-2 to
his personal account (T. 76-77).

Ms. Rasmussen perceived the

transfer as "highly irregular" and documented the transfer "as
per Mr. Crestani 5/19/82 2:30 p" (T. 76) ^State's Exhibit 4;
Appendix A ) .
A third transfer occurred on Jur^e 11, 1982, when
defendant personally appeared at the bank, made out a counter
check from MMD-2 to himself in the amount of $16,800, and then
deposited $16,000 into his personal account, keeping $800 in cash
(T. 80-82, 106) (State's Exhibit 5; Appendix A ) .
The last transfer occurred on August 13, 1983, when
defendant authorized $16,500 to be transferred from MMD-2 to his
personal account (T. 94) (State's Exhibit 6; Appendix A ) .
Sometime in June, 1982, defendant hired an accountant,
Roger Piburn, who later became the controller of Alta Title (T.
138-40).

In November, 1982, Piburn made an accounting of the

MMD-2 account because it was consistently being overdrawn (T.
144).

Piburn understood that MMD-2 was an escrow account (T.

143).

Piburn was curious why MMD-2 was consistently being

overdrawn, because, as Piburn testified, "an escrow account is
simply funds that we take in from a buyer and distribute exactly
the same amount that we take in, and there should be no
fluctuation in how much we take in from what we distribute."

(T.

144, 242.)
Piburn went back to February 9, 1982, when the account
was opened, and matched the disbursements with the deposits
through November, 1982 (T. 144, 153). By using the bank
statements and check vouchers, Piburn found there were
disbursements without corresponding deposits (T. 148, 162). Each
escrow deposit and disbursement had a reference number so Piburn
was able to match them up (T. 149).
2
According to Piburn, there were three

withdrawals that

had no corresponding deposits (T. 149). The three withdrawals
were on May 19, 1982, for $20,000; June 11, 1982, for $16,800;
and August 13, 1982, for $16,500 (T. 76-78, 80-81, 94-95, 149).
In December of 1982, Piburn spoke with defendant about
the three withdrawals (T. 150). Defendant told Piburn that there
was enough money in the account to cover the withdrawals (T.
150).

Piburn went back and attempted to identify sufficient

monies in MMD-2 to cover the withdrawals, but could find none (T.
150, 151). Piburn then re-examined the auditing records, the

On re-direct, Piburn stated there were four disbursements that
did not have corresponding deposits (T. 243). Later, he noted
that there were actually six to eight items, totalling over
$90,000, which were brought to his attention (T. 243-45).

individual transactions, and the bank statements to see if he had
made a mistake (T. 151). In Piburn's accounting of MMD-2, he
found only escrow funds or Badgen Contracting Servicing fees to
be contained in MMD-2 (T. 152-53)•

Although Piburn testified

that he knew defendant had personal money in the account, he also
testified that he took that money into consideration when he
3
performed the accounting of MMD-2 (T. 242),
Piburn also found that MMD-2 was an interest bearing
account with interest deposited directly into MMD-2 by the bank
(T. 157). Piburn was able to account for all of the interest in
MMD-2 (T. 158). To the best of his recollection "that interest
was put into the general fund as income" (T. 157). The general
fund account and MMD-2 were separate accounts (T. 251).
Lastly, Piburn found that defendant made weekly
withdrawals from $500 to $1,000 in cash and placed it "in his
pocket- (T. 251-52).
At trial, defendant attempted to show that he had
deposited personal money in MMD-2 sufficient to cover the
withdrawals in question.

Defendant called James Mclntyre, the

attorney for Alta Title (T. 340). Mclntyre testified that
defendant had personal money in MMD-2 (T. 348-49).

Mclntyre

recalled one specific occurrence where defendant's personal funds
were deposited in MMD-2 (T. 342). However, on cross-examination,
Mclntyre admitted that he really did not know if they were
personal funds, he merely assumed that they were (T. 352).
3
Piburn's original testimony was that there was no personal
money in MMD-2, but on cross-examination, Piburn stated that it
seemed like there were some personal transactions placed in the

Vicki Crestani, defendant's wife, also testified that
defendant had deposited personal money in MMD-2.

She claimed

that there were two deposits of $100,000 each in which
defendant's personal money was placed in MMD-2 (T. 419). Also,
there was a personal loan for $17,082 to purchase a boat that was
deposited in MMD-2 (R. 414-15).

Additionally, she stated that

two deposits, one for $15,000 and another for $19,896.53, were
placed into MMD-2 and were defendant's personal funds (T. 410).
Furthermore, she said there were a number of $50 deposits (as
many as 1800) into MMD-2 which were agency fees due defendant (T.
411).

Lastly, she alluded to a deposit of personal funds into

MMD-2 for about $8,000 (T. 412).
On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Mrs.
Crestani to pinpoint where in the MMD-2 records were any deposits
for exactly $100,000 (T. 425). The witness could not find a
deposit for $100,000 (T. 425). The witness also could not
explain a $17,082 withdrawal from MMD-2 which occurred just two
days after the $17,082 was deposited, payable to Alta Title, not
defendant (T. 437-38).

Mrs. Crestani further admitted that the

$15,000 she claimed was defendant's personal money was withdrawn
the same day it was deposited into MMD-2 (T. 471). Likewise, the
prosecution established that $19,869.73 was withdrawn from MMD-2
the same day it was deposited (T. 475-76).
Finally, the prosecution admitted two check drafts from
MMD-2, made payable to Alta Title Company, not defendant, which
were for "Agent Fees" and deposited into other accounts (T. 481,
483).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant fails to establish, under the Strickland
test# that trial counsels' preparation airid representation fell
below the standard of objective reasonableness guaranteed by the
United States and Utah Constitutions.

D0fendant's claim of

prejudice is purely speculative and is thus insufficient under
the Strickland test.

Because trial counsel's claimed

ineffectiveness can be considered sound trial strategy,
defendant's ineffective claim must fail.
Trial counsel's offering of a civil statute into
evidence was trial strategy consistent with the defense asserted
by counsel.

Therefore, trial counsel's tactical decision cannot

be grounds for ineffectiveness.
Considering the jury instructions as a whole,
Instruction No's. 16 and 25 were not misleading or prejudicial,
but rather, were helpful to the jury in determining whether
defendant was authorized to withdraw escrow funds for personal
use.

Under the circumstances, Instruction No. 25 was not

confusing or misleading to the extent that the jury disregarded
their duty to find each and every element pf the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The trial court properly instructed the jury on the
required culpable mental state of the offense of theft and
therefore did not err in refusing to give defendant's proffered
-specific intent" instruction.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE UTAH AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS.
Defendant argues that defendant was denied effective
assistance of counsel at trial because defense counsel failed to
obtain and examine all available evidence critical to his
defense.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel
"it is the defendant's burden to show:

(1) that this counsel

rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and
(2) that the outcome of the trial would probably have been
different but for counsel's error."

State v. Geary, 707 P.2d

645, 646 (Utah 1985); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203-04 (Utah 1984),
overruled on other grounds, 739 P.2d 628, 631 (Utah 1987)
(adopting Strickland test).

Failure to show either deficient

performance or resulting prejudice will defeat a claim of
ineffective counsel.

State v. Geary, 707 P.2d at 646.

In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court discuss
the various aspects of the test in order to assist courts in

Although defendant does not cite to any constitutional
provisions in the argument portion of his brief, the State
assumes that defendant asserts a violation of the United States
Constitution Amendments VI and XIV, and Utah Constitution Article
I SS 7 and 12, based upon defendant's "Determinative
Constitutional Provisions" section of his brief (Br. of App. at
2).
_i A -

applying the test to cases.
When a convicted defendant complains of the
ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the
defendant must show that counsel's
representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.
The proper measure of attorney performance
remains simply reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms.
Representation of a criminal defendant
entails certain basic duties. Counsel's
function is to assist the defendant, and
hence counsel owes the client a duty of
loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of
interest. . . . From counsel's function as
assistant to the defendant derive the
overarching duty to advocate the defendant's
cause and the more particular duties to
consult with the defendant on important
decisions and to keep the defendant informed
of important developments in the course of
the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to
bring to bear such skill and knowledge as
will render the trial a reliable adversarial
testing process. . . .
In any case presenting an ineffectiveness
claim, the performance inquiry must be
whether counsel's assistance was reasonable
considering all the circumstances. . . . The
purpose is simply to ensure that criminal
defendants receive a fair trial.
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance
must be highly deferential. It is all too
tempting for a defendant to second guess
counsel's assistance after conviction or
adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for
a court, examining counsel's defense after it
has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a
particular act or omission of counsel was
unreasonable. . . . A fair assessment of
attorney performance requires that every
effort be made to eliminate the distorting
effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsel's challenged
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from
counsel's perspective at the time. Because
of the difficulties inherent in making the
evaluation, a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged
action "might be considered sound trial
strategy." . . . There are countless ways to
provide effective assistance in any given
case. Even the best criminal defense
attorneys would not defend a particular
client in the same way. . . .
The availability of intrusive post-trial
inquiry into attorney performance or of
detailed guidelines for its evaluation would
encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal trials resolved
unfavorably to the defendant would
increasingly come to be followed by a second
trial, this one of counsel's unsuccessful
defense. . . •
Thus, a court deciding an actual
ineffectiveness claim must judge the
reasonableness of counsel's challenged
conduct on the facts of the particular case,
viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.
A convicted defendant making a claim of
ineffective assistance must identify the acts
or omissions of counsel that are alleged not
to have been the result of reasonable
professional judgment. The court must then
determine whether, in light of all the
circumstances, the identified acts or
omissions were outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance. In
making that determination, the court should
keep in mind that counsel's function, as
elaborated in prevailing professional norms,
is to make the adversarial testing process
work in the particular case. At the same
time, the court should recognize that counsel
is strongly presumed to have rendered
adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment.

An error by counsel, even if
professionally unreasonable, does not warrant
setting aside the judgment of a criminal
proceeding if the error had no effect on the
judgment. • . •

•

• • •

Representation is an art, and an act or
omission that is unprofessional in one case
may be sound or even brilliant in another.
Even if a defendant shows that particular
errors of counsel were unreasonable,
therefore, the defendant must show that they
actually had an adverse effect on the
defense.
It is not enough for the defendant to show
that the errors had some conceivable effect
on the outcome of the proceeding. • • .
. . . .

The defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.
. . . .

When a defendant challenges a conviction, the
question is whether there is a reasonable
probability that, absent the errors, the
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt
respecting guilt. . . .
Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly
supported by the record is more likely to
have been affected by errors than one with
overwhelming record support. . . .
In every case the court should be concerned
with whether, despite the strong presumption
of reliability, the result of the particular
proceeding is unreliable because of a
breakdown in the adversarial process that our
system counts on to produce just results.
466 U.S. at 687-96 (citations omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court most recently reitterated its
adoption of the Strickland test in State v. Archuletaf 747 P.2d
1019 (Utah 1987)i

Before this Court will consider whether
specific conduct falls below the required
standard of objective reasonableness, the
person arguing ineffective assistance must
show that the conduct prejudiced his case.
[Strickland, 466 U.S.] at 697, 104 S.Ct. at
2069; see also State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401,
405 (Utah 1986). In order to prove prejudice
to his case, "defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104
S.Ct. at 1028. . . .
Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023.
Defendant, in Point I of his brief, asserts that his
trial counsel was ineffective for two reasons.

First, he failed

to adequately investigate Alta Title's bank records and as a
result both he and his witnesses were unprepared for trial.
Second, trial counsel failed to call a key witness for the
defense.
Regarding the first claim, defendant asserts that
because trial counsel failed to obtain and examine all of Alta
Title's bank records, he was unaware of facts that may have
provided a complete defense to Count IV of the Information.
Defendant cites to an examination report of Alta Title's bank
records performed after trial by Leland Martineau, C.P.A.
At the hearing on defendant's Motion for New Trial,
Martineau testified that personal money of defendant was
available in MMD-2 that would have covered the last withdrawal of
$16,500 (Count IV) (T. 510, p. 28-30).

The basis of the "newly

discovered" funds was an alleged repayment of a personal loan (R.
510, p. 29-30).

Apparently, defendant loaned $24,000 to a Mr.
i

A_

Ray Fry.

Jd.

^he repayment of the loan/ plus interest, totalled

$24,622.50 which was deposited in MMD-2.

Id.

On cross-

examination, however, Martineau admitted that he did not know
whether the Source of the loan was from defendant's personal
money or not (R. 51^, p. 32). Hence, the loan repayment deposit
may or may no t have been personal funds.
rt

is well-established that proof of inadequate

representation »• . . . must be a demonstrable reality and not a
speculative natter.'"

Codianna v. Morris|, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109

(Utah 1983) (quoting State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah
1976)).

Because defendant's claim is based upon speculation,

defendant has failed to meet his burden of proof, which is, "but
for counsel'a unprofessional errors, the tesult of the proceeding
would have bs e n different."
Simply, ther^ ^ s

Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023.

evidence that due to ^rial counsel's alleged

no

failure to r^ v i e w an

0f

the bank records, defendant's cause was

prejudiced.
In

an effort to show that he lacked the requisite

intent, defendant argues that he made some deposits into MMD-2
which were withdrawn prior to the withdrawals charged in the
Information ancj that "the CPA found evidence that [defendant] may
not have known

o f ali o f

(emphasis add ed j.

[the] withdrawals."

(Br. of App. at 27)

Additionally, defendant claims that other

money was dep osit ed in MMD-2 which may or ntay not have been
withdrawn and he asserts that he "may have reasonably believed
that that mon ey

was

(Br. of App.

27) (emphasis added).

at

available to cover [the] withdrawals . . . ."

Again, defendant offers nothing but mere speculation
that he may have believed money was available to cover the
personal withdrawals from MMD-2.

This speculation is the basis

of defendant's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective.
Defendant's mere speculation is a far cry from "affirmatively
show[ing] that a 'reasonable probability' exists that, but for
counsel's error, the result would have been different."

State v.

Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).
Defendant also asserts that if trial counsel had
reviewed Alta Title's bank records, trial counsel could have used
the records to refresh the memory of the defendant and his wife.
Defendant then speculates that if that had been done, "they would
likely not have been made out to look like liars in front of the
jury" (Br. of App. at 32) (emphasis added).
In his attempt to establish prejudice, defendant merely
asserts that, maybe, the jury would have viewed his and his
wife's testimony more favorably had their memory been more
completely refreshed.

Again, defendant fails to establish a

"demonstrable reality" rather than a "speculative matter" as
required in Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 1109.
In Commonwealth v. Sellon, 402 N.E.2d 1329 (Mass.
1980), the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated:
Moreover, even if trial counsel wholly
failed to prepare his witnesses, Sellon has
failed to demonstrate any "issue of fact or
law that [as a result] could have been but
was not exploited by counsel for the
defendant's benefit in the original
proceedings." . . . Even if a defendant
demonstrates a deficiency in pretrial
preparation, "the defendant [can] make no
headway in the absence of a showing that the

fault probably resulted in forfeiture of a
substantial defense."
Sellon, 402 N.E.2d at 1335-36 (citations omitted).

In the

present case, defendant does not assert he lost a substantial
defense nor that "any issue of law or facft could have but was not
exploited by counsel for the defendant's benefit."

Id.

(See

alsof State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 586 P.2d 1253 (1978);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 15 Mass. App. 692, 448 N.E.2d 400 (1983);
State v. Long, 726 P.2d 1364 (Mont. 1986).

Clearly, trial

counsel's defense strategy was that defendant's personal money
was available in the MMD-2 account and th&t defendant therefore,
did not intend to deprive others of their money.

Therefore,

defendant's present claim of ineffectiveness can be disposed of
as sound trial strategy which cannot be grounds for reversal.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95.
Finally, defendant asserts that trial counsel failed to
call a key witness who would have possibly discredited the
prosecutions accountant witness.

In Commonwealth v. Rondeauf 392

N.E.2d 1001 (Mass. 1979), the Massachusetts Supreme Court said,
M

[i]neffectives is not established simply by showing that

[counsel] failed to call an additional witness . . . to bolster
the defense case."

Rondeau, 392 N.E.2d at 1004. The Utah

Supreme Court said, M[t]he calling of witnesses is a matter of
judgment on the part of a lawyer."
871, 872 (Utah 1976).

Batchelor v, Smith, 555 P.2d

Defendant fails to assert in his brief how

the testimony of Blake Hammond would discredit the State's
witness or how he was prejudiced by the absence of the testimony.
Therefore, defendant has failed to establish prejudice resulting

from any alleged ineffectiveness in trial counsel's decision to
not call Hammond as a witness.
As noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland said that the proper standard for attorney performance
is that of reasonably effective assistance, considering all the
circumstances.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

The Utah Supreme

Court has further stated that a defendant:
is entitled to the assistance of a competent
member of the bar, who shows a willingness to
identify himself with the interests of the
accused and present such defenses as are
available under the law and consistent with
the ethics of the profession.
State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (1976) (footnote omitted).
In People v. McGautha, 452 P.2d 650, 76 Cal.Rptr. 434
(1969), aff'd, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the court stated, "in inquiry
whether defendant received his constitutional right to 'effective
aid in the preparation and trial of the case' . . . we do not
attempt to measure such elusive qualities as the vigor of a
defense counsel's efforts."
omitted).

McGautha, 452 P.2d at 659 (citation

"The purpose of the inquiry is simply to insure that

defendant receives a fair trial."

Frame, 723 P.2d at 405.

Defendant must show that the "adversarial process of the trial
was so undermined that the jury could not have produced a just
result.-

Id.
In the present case, there is no question that trial

counsel is "a competent member of the bar."

Id.

He has been a

member of the bar since 1950, a former Utah Attorney General, a
seasoned criminal defense attorney, and a former municipal judge
in the Murray City court (R. 327). There is also no question

that trial counsel showed a willingness to identify himself with
the interests of defendant and presented such defenses as were
available.
In State v. Neal, the Arizona Supreme Court stated:
[Defendant's] attorney made pretrial motions,
called witnesses in the defendant's behalf,
and adequately cross-examined t^he State's
witnesses. [Defendant's] representation did
not reach the level where he was denied
effective assistance of counsel.
State v. Nealf 143 Ariz. 93, 692 P.2d 272, 280 (1984).

Here,

trial counsel gave vigorous cross-examination to the state's
witnesses (T. 58, 99, 123, 133, 163, 252, 271, 277, 297, 306,
308, 396), made numerous objections throughout the trial (T. 46,
71, 97, 141-42, 276, 295, 336, 403, 480, 485), 5 and made strong
arguments concerning the admissibility of evidence outside the
presence of the jury (T. 47, 86, 204, 380, 440, 452, 455, 543).
In evaluating trial counsel's effectiveness, the trial court
observed as follows:
As I sat through the case, I'm not so sure
that had they put on all the documentary
evidence it would have altered the outcome of
the case. I think there was some very
damaging evidence that gave rise to the
credibility of the defendant when he got on
the stand and testified.
(R. 512, p. 23). The Court further observed:
The one thing that keeps going through my
mind during all these hearings is the fact
that no one has ever taken into account the
testimony of the defendant and his wife. I

The cited objections by no means contain all of the objections
made by trial counsel during trial. They do, however, illustrate
the amount of zealousness that trial counsel exhibited during the
four day trial.

mean, as I sat through this trial, that might
have been the most damaging issue in this
whole case, was the testimony of those two. . . .
You stated before that they weren't
coherent. Well, they were so glib in their
answers, and that, I think, was a major
factor of this case. It was not a lack of
preparation as I reviewed all of this. It
was not the lack of preparation.
(R. 510, p. 38-39).

The Court's comments initiated the following

dialogue:
MR. CLARK:

Of course, Judge, I wasn't
there, but it seems to me that
when Mrs. Crestani was
confronted on the stand by Mr.
Bown with checks that directly
contradicted her previous
testimony that she deposited
monies to cover those charged
events, I'm sure she wasn't
glib then. She must have sat
back in her chair and
swallowed her tongue.

THE COURT:

That wasn't the case,
was the problem.

That

As I say, that element during
this whole proceeding has been
eliminated. So, I don't know
how you can go about
correcting your testimony.
Id.
Applying the facts of this case to the test set forth
in Strickland and followed in Frame, trial counsel's
representation did not fall below the objective standard of
reasonableness guaranteed by the Utah and United States
Constitutions.

As noted above, trial counsel vigorously pursued

the defense now espoused on appeal.

Defendant has failed to meet

his burden of showing ineffectiveness of counsel and prejudice

caused thereby.

Therefore, this Court should find that defendant

was afforded a fair trial with constitutionally sufficient
representation of counsel.
POINT II
TRIAL COUNSEL'S ACTIONS DID NOT CONSTITUTE
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, BUT RATHER, WERE
TRIAL STRATEGY.
Defendant further asserts that trial counsel was
ineffective because he offered into evidence a civil statute
which explains the duty of a title insurance agent regarding
escrow accounts (Utah Code Ann. S 31-25-26 (1981) (Repealed By
1985 Utah Laws, Ch. 242, S 58)) (T. 413).
As stated in Point I supra, the defendant must show (1)
that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some
demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial would
probably have been different but for counsel's error.
699 P.2d at 1204.

Lairby,

Furthermore, the Court in Strickland said, Ma

court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, that defendant must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action, 'might be
considered sound trial strategy."1

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that M[d]ecisions as
to . . . what objections to make . . . are generally left to the
professional judgment of counsel."
1021, 1023 (Utah 1987).

State v. Medina, 738 P.2d

In State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah

1982) the Court said, "[t]his Court will not second guess the
strategy of counsel at trial."

Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 59.

Similarly, other jurisdictions have also concluded that
trial tactics or strategy should be given wide latitude.

The

Colorado Supreme Court stated that the "public defender's
decision not to object to what the defendant characterizes as
prejudicial and irrelevant evidence falls within the reach of
trial strategy.M

People v. Bossertf 722 P.2d 998, 1010 (Colo.

1986).
In another case, the defendant argued that he was
"denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial
attorney emphasized defendant's past history of violence."
v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 633 P.2d 315, 322 (1981).

State

Because the

defendant's emotional state was one of the few arguments that
defendant's attorney could logically present with any hope of
success trial counsel chose to admit that evidence in an attempt
to support the insanity defense presented at trial.
23.

Ld. at 322-

The Court concluded that his decision was a legitimate trial

tactic, and "'[m]atters of trial strategy and tactics are
committed to defense counsel's judgment, and claims of
ineffective assistance cannot be predicated thereon.'"

Jd. at

323.
In the present case, trial counsel, while crossexamining five of the state's witnesses, asked if they had any
evidence that defendant exercised any unauthorized control over
the property of another (T. 58, 99, 133, 199). During
defendant's case in chief, trial counsel called James Mclntyre,
the attorney for Alta Title (T. 340). Trial counsel attempted to
show that it was proper, or at least not illegal, for the
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defendant to withdraw money from one account and deposit it into
another (T. 341-43).
In response to this line of questioning, the state
showed the witness the statute now in question (T. 355). Trial
counsel objected to the admittance of th0 statute (T. 366). The
court took it under advisement (T. 366). As stated above, the
statute explains that duty of a title insurance agent regarding
escrow accounts (T. 493).
Later in the case, Mrs. Crestani testified that the
defendant was a title insurance agent (T. 462). Trial counsel
asserted that defendant was not a title insurance agent, but a
partnership agent (T. 458). In an effort to establish that
defendant was a partnership agent and not a title insurance
agent, trial counsel re-called Gary Carlson (T. 491). Mr.
Carlson then explained that the defendant was an agent for outof-state partnerships (T. 491). Trial counsel then admitted the
civil statute (T. 493). The following dialogue between trial
counsel and Mr. Carlson occurred:
Q:

(By Mr. Hansen) All right. Now, again
that statute applies to the agent that
issues the title insurance policy saying
that the title of the property is okay?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Now, I think you said there was another
type of a dealing with partnerships?

A:

Right.

Q:

Does that have anything at £ll to do with
this [statute]?

A:

No.

Q:

Now, relative to the act that pertains to
out-of-state partnerships and other
designations, will you explain that act
as opposed to the act or the statute that
you have before you?

A:

Well, an out-of-state partnership has to
have some individual in the state that's
able to service the partnership itself.

Q:

Is that your understanding of the
capacity in which Mr. Crestani acts?

A:

Yes.

Q:

As in the partnership?

A:

Yes.

(T. 493-95).
Clearly, trial counsel's strategy was to show that
defendant did not exercise unauthorized control over another's
property.

When the testimony came forth that defendant may be an

agent, the State presented a civil statute to a defense witness
to show that the statute restricted what a title insurance agent
could do with escrow money.

The State attempted to have the

statute admitted, trial counsel objected, and the court took it
under advisement.

Trial counsel then made a tactical decision to

offer the statute to show that defendant was not a title
insurance agent, but a partnership agent.

As such, the fiduciary

responsibility set out in the civil statute did not apply to the
defendant.
Trial counsel's actions were clearly strategic.

By

claiming that the defendant was not a title insurance agent, he
furthered his defense that he did not exercise unauthorized
control over another's money which "was one of the few arguments
that defendant's attorney could logically present with any hope

of success."

Vickers, 633 P.2d at 323.

Because trial counsel's

actions were trial strategy, they cannot be considered
ineffective assistance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95.
POINT III

JURY INSTRUCTION NO'S. 16 AND 25 WERE NOT
MISLEADING OR PREJUDICIAL WHEN CONSIDERING
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AS A WHOI^E.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in giving
Jury Instruction No's. 16 and 25 because they were misleading and
unfairly prejudicial.

The challenged jury instructions read as

follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 16
You are instructed that the laws of the
State of Utah applicable at the pertinent
times in this case provide that a title
insurance agent may engage in the escrow,
settlement or closing business, or any
combination of such business, and operate as
escrow, settlement or closing agent provided
that all funds deposited with the agent in
connection with any escrow, settlement or
closing shall be deposited in a bank in a
separate trust account, or accounts and such
funds shall be the property of the person or
persons entitled thereto under provisions of
the escrow, settlement or closing and
segregate escrow by escrow, settlement by
settlement, or closing by closing in the
records of the agent. These fur^ds shall not
be subject to any debt of the agent and shall
be used only to fulfill the terms of the
individual escrow, settlement or closing
under which the funds were accepted, and none
of the funds shall be used until all
conditions of the escrow, settlement or
closing have been met.
Any interest received or funds deposited
with the agent in connection with any escrow,
settlement or closing which are deposited in
a bank shall be paid over to the depositing
party to the escrow, settlement or closing
and shall not be transferred to the account
of the agent.
(R. 140.)

INSTRUCTION NO. 25
You are instructed that if you find that
the MMD-2 account was used as an escrow
account then the defendant had no authority
to use the funds of another for his own use.
(R. 149.)
In considering whether a jury instruction was proper, the Utah
Supreme Court has stated:
As we have reiterated innumberable times one
instruction should not be considered in
isolation in order to predicate a claim of
error upon it, but the instructions must be
read and understood as a connected whole.
Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16, 20, 414 P.2d 575, 577 (1966)
(footnote omitted).

The Court has further added:

the law in Utah is that jury instructions are
to be considered as a whole. . . . When
taken as a whole, if they fairly tender the
case to the jury, the fact that one or more
of the instructions, standing alone, are not
as full or accurate as they might have been
is not reversible error.
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981) (citations
omitted).
Defendant, in the instant case, claims that the
challenged instructions, standing alone, led the jury to look for
civil misconduct, which eventually led them to believe that
defendant was guilty of the criminal charges.

Defendant ignores

that the challenged instructions were relevant to prove the
element of unauthorized control over another's property.
Theft is defined as follows:
A person commits theft if he obtains or
exercises unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive
him thereof.
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In

fact, as mentioned in Point II, the defense offered the civil
statute (Utah Code Ann. S 31-25-26 (1981)) in an attempt to show
that defendant was not a title insurance agent, and therefore,
was not statutorily restricted in exercising control over the
account.

Therefore, Instruction No. 16 was not misleading, but

rather, helpful to the jury in determining whether defendant
exercised unauthorized control over the MMD-2 escrowed funds.
Further, there was testimony at trial that MMD-2 was
not solely an escrow account (T. Ill, 239, 292, 353, 426, 511).
Therefore, a critical question of fact existed whether the MMD-2
monies used by defendant were his own or were escrowed funds of
others.

Thus, Instruction No. 25 was given to clarify to the

jury that they must determine whether defendant used escrow
monies of other persons without proper authorization.
Defendant further claims that Instruction No. 25 was
flawed in that it may create a rebuttable presumption that if the
jury finds MMD-2 to be an escrow account, then they must find
that defendant exercised unauthorized control over property of
another.

Defendant's claim strains common-sense and ignores the

fundamental principle that jury instructions must be reviewed as
a whole.
The jury heard extensive testimpny from both the state
and defense on the issue of whether the monies used by defendant
were his personal funds or those of another.

The jury was

further instructed that in order to convict defendant, they must
find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant (1) obtained or
Cont.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978) (emphasis added).

exercised unauthorized control over the property of another, (2)
that he did so with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and
(3) that such property exceeded $1,000 in value (R. 141; Jury
Instruction No. 17). Clearly, taking the instructions as a whole
in the context of the present case, the jury could not have been
sufficiently confused or mislead by Instruction No. 25 to the
extent that they disregarded their duty to find each and every
element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Finally, defendant claims that a "perverse synergistic
effect" occurred by the combination of Instruction No's. 16 and
25.

Because, as argued above, the jury instructions, when taken

as a whole, were not confusing or misleading, the combination of
any individual instructions cannot be said to be misleading.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
REGARDING THE CULPABLE MENTAL STATE OF THEFT
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred
by refusing to give a "specific intent" instruction.

Defendant's

claim is clearly without merit.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Calamity,

7

735 P.2d

39, 43 (Utah 1987) explained that:
The terms "general intent" and "specific
intent" are no longer used in our present
criminal code which refers to "culpable
mental states." U.C.A., 1953, S 76-2-102
provides as follows:

Apparently, West Publishing Co. inadvertently mistitled the
case of State v. Whitehair, 54 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Ut. Sup. Ct.
filed 3/23/87) as State v. Calimity, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah 1987).
Mr. Calimity was a co-defendant of Mr. Whitehair, was acquitted,
and did not appeal. JId. at 40.

Every offense not involving
strict liability shall require
a culpable mental state, and
when the definition of the
offense does not specify a
culpable mental state and the
offense does not involve
strict liability, intent,
knowledge, or recklessness
shall suffice to establish
criminal responsibility.
As noted earlier, the offense of theft is defined as
follows:
Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft
if he obtains or exercises unauthorized
control over the property of another with a
purpose to deprive him thereof.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978).

The statute further defines a

"purpose to deprive" as follows:
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the
conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently
or for so extended a period or to use
under such circumstances that a
substantial portion of its economic value,
or of the use and benefit thereof, would
be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon
payment of a reward or other compensation;
or
(c) To dispose of the property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that
the owner will recover it.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-401(3) (1978) (emphasis added).

Thus, the

culpable mental state of theft is a "purpdse to deprive" as
further defined in the statute.
In the present case, the jury was instructed regarding
the meaning of the term "purpose to deprive.M

"Purpose to deprive" means to have the
conscious object to withhold property
permanently or for so extended a period or to
use under such circumstances that a
substantial portion of its economic value, or
of the use and benefit thereof, would be
lost; or to dispose of property under
circumstances that make it unlikely that the
owner will recover it.
(R. 38; Jury Instruction No. 14). The culpable mental state of
theft being set forth in the elements of the offense, and clearly
defined for the jury, the trial court properly refused to give
the improper and antiquated "specific intent" instruction offered
o

by defendant.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, respondent respectfully
requests that defendant's convictions be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this <£>/ ^day of July, 1988.
DAVID L. WILKINSON

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General

Notably, defense counsel in the present case was also counsel
in State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah 1987).
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